With Israeli projectiles impacting, the Middle East edged closer to a widespread regional conflict. Iran’s Islamic Republic experienced, for the first time since the 1980s, a direct military strike from a different regional state, which not only struck its territory but also the regime’s symbolic and political core.
Currently, that conflict is on hold due to a truce, and despite considerable anticipation and near-frenzied speculation, the government retains control. Iran’s authorities might have endured this phase, yet their authority is now more precarious than before. An intensification of domestic control and the initiation of internal purges to identify alleged Israeli collaborators are highly probable, if not already in progress. The leadership will attempt to highlight its military endurance, but beneath this facade exists a worsening crisis and persistent governance issues. Although Iranians showed solidarity against the unparalleled Israeli and U.S. attacks, the conflict provoked critical inquiries into the regime’s persistence and Iran’s development.
The direct cause was military. On June 12, Israel initiated deep strikes within Iranian land, followed by further attacks on June 22 aimed at nuclear facilities. The Trump Administration presented the operation as essential to “perpetually dismantle” Iran’s armaments capacity. Characteristically, Trump complemented the assault with a pledge to “rebuild,” hinting that overthrowing the government was the objective.
However, on June 24, Trump altered his stance and declared a cessation of hostilities. The conditions are undefined, and the implementation method is obscure. What is evident, though, is that Iran’s governmental and military framework remains predominantly undamaged. The notion that a long-standing regime could be overthrown by an Israeli air campaign without ground troops or internal backing has once more been shown to be unrealistic.
The Islamic Republic is not a delicate autocracy sustained by one individual. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s well-being has consistently been a topic of speculation, yet the government has maintained stability. The Revolutionary Guards continue to be formidable, profoundly integrated, and committed to the system—if not to their own continued existence.
Nevertheless, persistence does not equate to might. The conflict revealed a government incapable of safeguarding its own urban areas or populace from external aggression. The Islamic Republic is economically strained and under severe penalties. It has dedicated decades to presenting itself as a protector of national independence, but its display of might and defensive approach have proven empty. This deficiency has created fresh avenues not merely for critique, but for envisioning new possibilities.
For many years, Iranians have organized demonstrations against what they oppose: religious governance, malfeasance, and oppression. However, in this period of turmoil, a more challenging and fundamental inquiry into what Iranians desire and who possesses the authority to determine it is re-emerging.
That resolution cannot originate from banished monarchs or international figures. It must emerge domestically. Recent movements provided an insight, representing the most varied and expansive demonstrations in Iran’s recent past. The Iranian expatriate community reacted with unmatched vigor, arranging gatherings and suggesting frameworks for a post-Islamic Republic shift. Yet, a significant portion of that impetus diminished, partly owing to the re-involvement of Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of the preceding Shah, who is once more echoing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s appeal for Iranians to “take control.”
The way forward does not involve reinstating a monarchy, nor a government-in-exile facilitated by foreign powers. It demands the arduous, intentional endeavor of constructing a representative framework that mirrors and incorporates the complete range of Iranian populace across various ethnic, religious, geographical, and gender divisions. This implies prioritizing restorative justice over retribution, and systemic structures over individual figures.
Iranians are aware of the hazards associated with externally instigated government changes. In 1953, a coup supported by the U.S. and U.K. removed the democratically chosen Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, reinstating the Shah and suppressing dissent. In 1979, a revolution seeking liberty was usurped by a religious ruling class. In both instances, Iranians forfeited control of their destiny to opportunists who pledged deliverance but instead imposed subjugation.
Iranians have also long harbored apprehensions about the possibility of a civil conflict akin to Syria’s, internal fragmentation, or foreign interference presented as emancipation. These concerns are not merely academic historical concepts or remote lessons derived from the wider Middle East. They are actively intensified by the nation’s continuous encounter with economic hardship. Decades of extensive sanctions have undermined the financial basis of daily existence, depleted governmental efficacy, and resulted in a fractured societal agreement.
The conflict might be suspended. Yet, the resolution is far from complete. The Iranian government is bruised but remains whole, and will undoubtedly search for an exit, potentially via an agreement brokered by Trump that guarantees its continuance, limits subsequent Israeli assaults, and delivers much-anticipated relief from sanctions. However, any international diplomatic settlement must be accompanied by a domestic reconsideration.
What is in contention is not solely foreign relations but also political self-determination. The upcoming challenge for Iran involves conceiving a future not constructed by powerful figures or envisioned by external entities, but founded on diversity and novel governance that obtains its legitimacy from its populace.