Somalia is once again experiencing rising tensions. The East African nation has been embroiled in civil conflict since the collapse of its central government in 1991, triggered by uprisings against the military dictatorship of the time. Since then, successive Somali governments have strived to develop the state’s capabilities, strengthen its democratic institutions, and expand its control over its territory. However, none have succeeded in quelling the intense and deadly struggles for power and resources.
Currently, the administration of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is preparing for the 2026 national elections by advancing contentious electoral reforms that it claims are necessary to improve the system. However, opposition figures, as well as the regional states of Puntland and Jubaland, allege that these reforms are designed to secure Mohamud’s reelection and extend his term. This disagreement is causing stagnation and threatens to escalate into violence.
Meanwhile, Islamist militant groups are intensifying their activities. Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgency group that has been fighting the central government for two decades in southern and central Somalia, is expanding its influence. So is the Islamic State. (Although the latter has suffered considerable setbacks recently due to a campaign by Puntland forces, supported by the UAE and the U.S.)
Against this backdrop, international donors, who have long supported Somalia’s state-building efforts, are becoming increasingly impatient.
The vote impasse
The dispute over elections, which are scheduled to take place by May, casts a shadow over Somalia. Mohamud seeks to abolish the existing system, which in 2021 saw only 28,000 voters out of a population of 15 million select the country’s leaders. He intends to replace the indirect voting process with universal suffrage.
The central government’s ambition to strengthen democratic participation is commendable. It has already established an electoral commission and started registering voters. However, time is running out, and many observers believe that the only way to hold elections on time is to maintain the current indirect system. The previous president, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, controversially extended his term by 15 months when the 2021 election was delayed.
The dispute has remained largely peaceful so far. However, tensions are rising in Mogadishu—two people died in late September after clashes between rival security units following a visit by opposition politicians to a local police station.
Political obstacles
The electoral dispute underscores Somalia’s persistent political challenges. Since its establishment in 2012, with U.S. backing, to succeed a series of unstable transitional governments, the central government has struggled to operate effectively. More than a decade later, the constitution remains provisional, and there is no consensus on how power should be divided between the central government in Mogadishu and Somalia’s seven member states, some of which function with considerable autonomy.
Some of the more assertive states, including Puntland in the north and Jubaland in the south, have essentially withdrawn from Somalia’s federal system. Tensions between Mogadishu and Jubaland even escalated into armed conflict near the Kenyan border in December, following a disagreement over the re-election of Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, the state’s leader and a current opponent of Mohamud. Both sides are now vying for control of Jubaland’s northern Gedo region.
These persistent internal divisions have hampered Somalia’s ability to address its most challenging problems, including the fight against Al-Shabaab, adapting to prolonged drought, promoting economic development, and finalizing the constitution.
Meanwhile, Somalia faces a significantly altered aid landscape. The central government depends on foreign aid for two-thirds of its budget, and the African Union’s peacekeeping mission supports its security. The Trump Administration cut aid from $750 million in 2024 to $150 million this year.
Somalia has diversified its external support in recent years, including seeking assistance from Turkey and some Gulf states, but it is struggling to compensate for a substantial reduction in Western aid.
The search for solutions
The situation is not entirely bleak. The central government has largely pushed Al-Shabaab out of urban areas, facilitating an economic revival, particularly in Mogadishu, where new high-rise buildings are appearing across the capital. This has enabled the establishment of the basic structures of the federal state, including national and local ministries. While violence still occurs in Mogadishu—Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an attack earlier this month, for example, and has made attempts on Mohamud’s life—the frequency of large-scale incidents has decreased significantly.
No one wants these achievements to be undone. Somalia’s political leaders must urgently demonstrate to the international community that their state-building project is still worth investing in. In the short term, this requires reaching a compromise on the electoral system and holding elections on schedule next year.
In the longer term, politicians need to improve the functioning of the federal system. This would involve clearly defining the powers that should reside at the national level, those reserved for the states, and how the two levels of government should interact. Reinstating regular meetings between Mogadishu and member states would be a useful initial step, but it will need to be followed by significant pragmatism and compromise from both sides.
Resolving these underlying tensions will help the federal system operate more effectively, reverse the trend of political fragmentation, and enable a more unified response to shared challenges. Somalia’s political leadership, both government and opposition, needs to move the country forward.
Failure to do so will result in greater division, donor disillusionment, and opportunities for Al-Shabaab. Ultimately, it is the ordinary people of Somalia who will suffer the consequences.