When Ahmed al-Sharaa addresses the U.N. General Assembly, it will mark another significant point in his unlikely path. Previously, for many years, he was recognized solely as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the enigmatic head of Syria’s al-Qaeda faction, with a $10 million U.S. reward offered for his capture. Fast forward to Sunday, he landed in New York City by private jet, stepping out in an elegant suit. Since then, he has been celebrated by the Syrian expatriate community and held discussions with former CIA director Gen. David Petraeus.
However, even as Sharaa’s first appearance at the U.N. helps to cement his government’s recognition, the conditions within Syria itself remain unstable. The global community, currently extending a welcome to Sharaa, ought to urge him to implement truly inclusive governance, rather than supporting his efforts to exert authority over a nation that is still fractured.
Just ten months prior, President Bashar al-Assad’s administration held sway over the majority of Syria. Nevertheless, a late 2024 offensive spearheaded by Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham resulted in the collapse of the Syrian military’s defenses. Insurgents rapidly moved throughout the nation, and Assad departed. Sharaa unexpectedly assumed the role of Syria’s effective leader, bringing an end to five decades of Assad family governance.
Sharaa’s recently formed government received a favorable reception internationally. Nations actively pursued the restoration of diplomatic relations. The Trump Administration initially demonstrated less enthusiasm for Sharaa, seemingly influenced by an Israeli government that viewed Syria’s new head with skepticism. Yet, Saudi Arabia’s crown prince arranged a meeting between Trump and Sharaa in May, following which Trump referred to the Syrian leader as a “terrific individual.” The Trump Administration subsequently became a strong supporter of Sharaa’s government.
During his initial period in office, Sharaa focused on gaining international legitimacy. He rarely communicated with the Syrian populace, even as he made numerous trips abroad and hosted a succession of foreign dignitaries in Damascus. This approach appeared successful. Sharaa achieved extensive global acknowledgment for Syria’s post-Assad political structure, and, equally important, obtained crucial assistance from Gulf nations and other sources that Syria desperately requires for its recovery and reconstruction.
Domestically, however, the stability and acceptance of Sharaa’s government continue to appear precarious. His administration has solidified its power, but through methods that have strengthened its autocratic tendencies. Sharaa was declared president by unanimous consent at a “Victory Conference” of insurgent commanders in January, where he declared the disbandment of armed groups. His government arranged a “Syria’s Future Conference” the following month, but this event was brief—lasting only a day and a half—and lacked substantial, thorough discussion. In March, his government revealed a detailed draft constitution outlining a projected five-year transitional period. This document grants Sharaa immense, largely unchallenged authority. Currently, the government is setting up parliamentary elections, but the electoral process is expected to be tightly controlled; one-third of the parliamentary seats will be designated by the presidency.
Sharaa disassociated himself from al-Qaeda several years past. Nevertheless, he continues to indirectly embody a Sunni Islamist political agenda. While Sunni Arabs constitute a majority of Syria’s populace, the nation also encompasses numerous religious and ethnic minority groups, such as Alawites, Christians, Druze, and Kurds. Many of these minority communities—alongside Sunni Arabs who do not align with Sharaa’s societal and cultural perspective—are apprehensive about their prospects in this newly configured Syria. Furthermore, actual authority remains concentrated within a confined group comprising his relatives and former members of Tahrir al-Sham.
Sharaa possesses limited tangible advantages that he can provide to the wider Syrian populace. The nation’s economy continues to be severely damaged, a consequence of years of conflict and stringent sanctions. His administration has promoted significant development initiatives, but these are only projected to yield benefits for average Syrians in the medium to long run.
Moreover, Syria remains territorially fragmented. In areas under government command, Damascus maintains a fragile grip over previous opposition groups. Sharaa’s endeavors to expand governmental authority across the remaining parts of Syria have encountered strong opposition at the country’s borders. In March, forces aligned with the government suppressed a revolt on the Syrian coast, but in doing so, they alienated substantial portions of the populace. When government troops and their paramilitary allies advanced on Suweida in July, Israel intervened militarily to compel their retreat. Suweida largely stays beyond Sharaa’s influence, with local leaders now advocating for self-governance. Concurrently, Northeast Syria continues to be controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. The execution of a March accord aimed at integrating this area into the rest of Syria has been delayed. Some who back Damascus now express concerns about a potential “alliance of minorities” forming against Syria’s new government.
Sharaa will probably continue to receive backing from the international community. Notably, U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack, has become a prominent advocate for Damascus, frequently asserting that no feasible substitute for Sharaa exists. However, Barrack’s endorsement of Syria’s central government—or simply “Syria,” as he has termed it—during discussions with groups in the country’s border regions has emboldened Damascus to launch an offensive on Suweida.
In New York this week, Sharaa plans to argue for additional sanctions waivers and global endorsement for a cohesive Syria—a message expected to be met with a positive reception at the U.N. General Assembly. Nevertheless, the international community should proceed with caution.
Syria remains fragmented, and its true legitimacy is still disputed, even at present. Should nations back a singular factional initiative to unite Syria—without compelling Damascus to address its errors thus far—they risk triggering fresh instability and violence.