The unveiling last week of a 28-point proposal aimed at ending the conflict in Ukraine has prompted discussion of —and . Part of this involves outstanding questions, which Reuters reported on Wednesday were sourced from a Russian document presented to the Trump Administration last month. Following intensive diplomatic efforts by Ukraine and Europe this week, a significantly more advantageous plan for Kyiv has emerged. However, regrettably, the updated proposal, based on a [missing word], is unlikely to secure Moscow’s acceptance.
The implications are immense. Should peace negotiations fail, a war that has claimed hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian and Russian lives will persist. Moreover, there is a tangible danger that Ukraine’s military standing could deteriorate, if not completely collapse; U.S. Army Secretary Daniel P. Driscoll delivered this warning to Kyiv last week, noting Russia’s accumulation of sufficient long-range missiles that could [missing word]. This caution surfaces amidst persistent anxieties regarding Ukraine’s [missing word] and Russia’s seemingly limitless capacity to maintain the conflict.
It is crucial to emphasize that while the initial draft plan necessitates some difficult concessions, it does not signify Ukrainian “[missing word]” to Russia’s aggressive war. In contrast to Russia’s initial ambition at the war’s outset for Ukraine’s complete subjugation, and considering Ukraine’s historical context over the past four centuries, it could legitimately be deemed a qualified Ukrainian triumph. Nearly 80% of Ukraine would endure as free, independent, well-armed, and with an acknowledged pathway to European Union membership.
The Trump Administration ought to encourage Ukraine and Europe to endorse the initial plan, incorporating only minor alterations.
Regarding the vital matter of Ukraine’s NATO membership, the original plan [missing word] that “Ukraine commits to codify in its constitution a prohibition against joining NATO, and NATO agrees to incorporate into its statutes a clause stipulating Ukraine’s future non-admission.” The European counter-proposal substitutes this with “Ukraine’s accession to NATO is contingent on the consensus of NATO members, which is currently absent.” This statement is indeed accurate, and it spares the Ukrainian and European governments the politically challenging and awkward obligation of retracting a long-held stance. However, it appears highly improbable to appease the Russian government, which maintains that the West had previously [missing word] not to expand NATO eastward, commitments they believe were violated.
Concerning the equally critical subject of NATO forces in Ukraine, the initial plan merely stated that “NATO pledges not to deploy troops in Ukraine.” The European counter-proposal stipulates that “NATO agrees not to permanently station troops under its command in Ukraine during peacetime.” This wording allows for the potential formation of a European “reassurance force” supplied by NATO members but not operating under formal NATO command. Yet, Moscow has repeatedly [missing word]. And while Britain and France have [missing word] to commit personnel as part of a multinational force, the majority of other nations have not, leading to an insufficient number of troops. Such a force would be extremely exposed, without genuinely bolstering Ukraine. Is it justifiable to forfeit the prospect of peace for this illusory undertaking?
The initial plan would involve [missing word] invested in U.S.-led reconstruction initiatives, with the United States obtaining “50% of the profits” and Europe contributing an additional $100 billion. The European counter-proposal states that “Ukraine will undergo complete reconstruction and financial redress, partly utilizing Russian sovereign assets that will remain frozen until Russia provides restitution for damage to Ukraine.” While the (distinctly Trumpian) 50% American share appears outwardly quite extravagant, the primary concern is ensuring the availability of funds for Ukraine’s rebuilding. If this can be accomplished not solely with Russian money but with Russia’s consent, then this option should be embraced if the alternative entails a collapse of discussions.
Further concerns are largely secondary. The original plan, for instance, restricts the Ukrainian army to 600,000 personnel, but that is [missing word], and constitutes a considerably larger military than Ukraine could realistically sustain during peacetime. Such a contingent could dissuade Moscow from reigniting an exceedingly expensive conflict—one that would negate all advantages derived from improved relations with the U.S. Ultimately, the most significant deterrent remains the fact that the Russian invasion has entailed such immense losses for territorial acquisitions that significantly fell short of Moscow’s original objectives.
Nonetheless, there exists one element within the initial plan that Ukraine genuinely cannot endorse in its present form: Ukraine’s withdrawal from the [missing word]. This would, admittedly, constitute a moral rather than a practical detriment for Ukraine. This territory accounts for barely 1% of Ukraine, and the majority of its populace has already evacuated. The original plan would involve demilitarizing the eastern zone, enabling Ukraine to construct new defensive fortifications, thereby ensuring the military repercussions would not be severe.
Foremost, those who champion the dismissal of this imperfect, yet ultimately viable, framework ought to question whether there is any plausible likelihood of Ukraine’s military situation improving if the conflict persists. The available data indicates the contrary. This could represent the final opportunity to secure genuine peace, one that can circumvent additional years of warfare that might leave Ukraine in an unaltered or worse state.