In June 2020, a deadly border conflict erupted between India and China in Ladakh, the most serious since their 1962 war. This significantly strained relations between the nuclear powers, reaching their lowest point in decades. However, after four years of strained relations, a reconciliation is underway.
India and China finalized a border agreement last month, outlining the resumption of patrols in Ladakh and troop disengagement to pre-conflict positions. This agreement facilitated a meeting on October 23 between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping—their first since the 2020 Ladakh clash—during a BRICS summit in Russia. Both leaders committed to enhancing communication and collaboration.
These developments offer an opportunity to improve relations. India has consistently maintained that border tensions must ease before significant progress can be made; this condition has now been met. This improved atmosphere can also boost existing areas of cooperation. Despite ongoing tensions, trade has continued, and the border deal’s positive impact could attract further Chinese investment in India. New Delhi and Beijing collaborate in various global forums, including BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. They share common interests in counter-terrorism, multilateralism, non-Western economic models, and rejecting what they perceive as U.S. moral posturing globally.
A lasting reconciliation between these Asian giants would have significant global implications, including for Washington’s strategic partnership with New Delhi, driven by the shared aim of countering Chinese influence. However, it could also mitigate the uncertainty surrounding President-elect Donald Trump, should he choose to soften his stance on Beijing and pursue his own rapprochement with Xi—a leader Trump has frequently praised.
However, the extent of this thaw should not be overstated. India-China relations remain deeply complex and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
The Ladakh agreement does little to resolve the broader India-China border dispute. The countries share a 2,100-mile border, a significant portion of which is contested—an area comparable in size to Greece. Furthermore, mistrust between border troops persists; the traumatic events of the Ladakh clash—including reports of Indian soldiers being beaten to death with iron rods and thrown into icy rivers—remain a sensitive issue.
Tensions exist elsewhere as well. China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure project, which New Delhi opposes due to its passage through Indian-claimed territory, remains a point of contention. India is also concerned about Beijing’s naval expansion in the Indian Ocean, extending eastward from a string of artificial islands to what New Delhi believes are Chinese spy ships operating near the Andaman Sea, where India has island territories. Closer to home, New Delhi is wary of the surveillance risks associated with Chinese technologies within India.
Moreover, India and China have strong security ties with each other’s main rivals. A series of agreements have brought the Indian and U.S. militaries to unprecedented levels of cooperation, escalating arms sales and technology transfers. India has become a key security partner for the U.S., actively countering Chinese provocations. The U.S. has even shared intelligence with New Delhi at critical junctures. Meanwhile, Beijing continues its long-standing security alliance with Islamabad, providing substantial military aid, including equipment for ballistic missiles (which has led to a series of recent escalations).
Furthermore, India and China hold deeply contrasting views on fundamental issues. Beijing supports many insurgent groups in Kashmir, the disputed region that has triggered multiple India-Pakistan wars. India is in conflict with Taiwan, which Beijing considers a breakaway province. The Dalai Lama—the exiled Tibetan leader whom Beijing views as a dangerous separatist—has long resided in India. India and China also participate in rival global forums: India is involved in the Indo-Pacific Quad, while China leads the BRI.
Nevertheless, bilateral ties are expected to continue improving. Ongoing border talks—which have resumed since the Ladakh crisis—to address other contentious issues and reaffirm mutual commitments to protocols prohibiting the use of firearms, could help prevent future conflicts. The next opportunity for high-level discussions may arise this month, should Modi and Xi attend the G20 summit in Brazil.
The greatest potential for stronger ties lies in their economic relationship (China was India’s largest trading partner last year). India’s chief economic advisor advocates for increased Chinese FDI, which could accelerate Beijing’s long-term investment plans in major Indian industries. China, facing recent economic challenges, could also benefit from greater engagement with the world’s fastest-growing major economy.
Trump’s potential return could also foster increased India-China economic cooperation, if shared concerns over U.S. tariffs incentivize them to expand their commercial partnerships.
In conclusion, relations will fluctuate between cooperation, particularly in the economic sphere, and competition, possibly even confrontation. However, even a moderate improvement in India-China relations is positive. The world is facing numerous challenges, and another crisis—let alone a conflict—is something it cannot afford.