The upcoming election on Sunday carries immense significance.
For two consecutive years, the largest economy in the E.U. has been struggling economically, a situation predicted to worsen should Donald Trump act on his threats to impose tariffs on Europe.
The potential agenda of the new U.S. administration has triggered unprecedented concerns regarding Germany’s security since the Cold War ended.
Furthermore, crimes involving migrants have eroded public trust in the immigration system, creating an opportunity for the Alternative for Germany (AfD). The German far-right party is anticipated to achieve its best electoral performance in the postwar period, ready to capitalize on any perceived shortcomings of the incoming government.
Polls leading up to the election suggest that Friedrich Merz, the leader of the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU), is poised to succeed the center-left government. He faces considerable challenges, some beyond his control and others resulting from his own actions.
Firstly, regarding the issues outside Merz’s direct influence: Germany’s economic model is under pressure, with its manufacturing sector impacted by the cessation of inexpensive energy imports from Russia and escalating competition from China in the global market. These issues are expected to intensify if the U.S. President implements his tariff plans. The automotive industry, a crucial part of the economy, is particularly vulnerable, as Germany exports more cars to the U.S. than any other nation.
Secondly, the uncertainty surrounding European security has highlighted Germany’s need to enhance its defense capabilities more rapidly than it has in the past 30 years. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, Scholz declared a Zeitenwende—a turning point—committing to a new era of German rearmament. However, the investments in the German army over the past three years have been insufficient. Combat readiness has actually declined due to the transfer of equipment to Ukraine.
As the U.S. increasingly focuses on domestic issues, Germany must assume a pivotal role in Europe’s defense. This requires not only financial resources but also difficult political choices, such as potentially reinstating some form of conscription. Merz seems to recognize this challenge. On Friday, he suggested that Europe should consider the possibility that the U.S. might not defend its European allies.
Finally, migration is a leading concern for voters, according to polls. The public is weary of violent incidents committed by refugees and asylum seekers, including a stabbing just 10 days before the election. A perception of a dysfunctional system has fueled support for the AfD, which openly advocates “remigration,” a term for mass deportations used by white nationalists. Some of the AfD’s sister parties on the far-right, such as Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, distance themselves from the German party due to its extreme stance on remigration.
However, some problems are attributable to Merz’s own decisions. His hasty move to rely on votes from the AfD to pass a resolution—an unprecedented event in postwar Germany—has made him appear imprudent and willing to take risks.
According to Nils Schmid, an MP for the Social Democrats, a potential coalition partner for the CDU, this decision has eroded trust between Merz and potential center-left coalition partners at a crucial time when swift negotiations are needed to establish a stable government.
Merz’s maneuver, although clumsy, acknowledged that restoring public confidence in migration policy is essential for the success of the next government. The resolution, passed with AfD support, promised a show of force, which Merz has since admitted would be impossible to implement. However, enforcing the existing regulations would be sufficient. Several recent attacks were carried out by migrants whose asylum claims had been denied and were awaiting deportation.
The CDU leader also remains a public supporter of the “debt brake,” a constitutional restriction on deficit spending in most cases. This policy was introduced by Merz’s CDU predecessor, Angela Merkel, to appeal to fiscally conservative voters, but it now seems inadequate given Germany’s urgent need to invest in infrastructure and defense.
Fortunately for Merz, the unprecedented security situation can provide political justification for relaxing the debt brake, at least for defense spending. Voters may allow him some flexibility with deficit rules, recognizing that conventional politics are insufficient to address the country’s pressing challenges.
All major parties, including the CDU, have ruled out cooperating with the AfD, so the party will almost certainly be excluded from government this term. However, if the next government struggles, a strengthened AfD could argue that Germans should give them a chance, having been failed by all other major parties. Across Europe, from France to Austria, the cordon sanitaire preventing cooperation with the far-right is weakening. For now, it remains in place, but it may be unsustainable by the time of the next election.
These are the challenges that a Chancellor Merz would confront: to succeed with one of the most difficult situations faced by an incoming chancellor in 30 years, or risk being remembered as the leader who paved the way for the first far-right German government since 1945.
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